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LIFE AFTER AMCHEM: THE CLASS
STRUGGLE CONTINUES
Elizabeth J. Cabraser*
I. INTRODUCTION
And so the much dreaded and anticipated Amchem' decision has
come, and that settlement is gone-at least for now-living only in
the vigorous dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer.2 The Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court have interceded to spare the
"unselfconscious and amorphous legions" of asbestos victims and
their families3 the indignity to their legal due process rights that
might have accompanied the prospect for monetary compensation in
their lifetimes offered by the $1 billion-plus settlement. The champi-
ons of due process rejoice, as do those lawyers with large inventories
of asbestos claims whose proprietary interests in the serial filing, try-
ing, and settling of "their" clients' claims ad infinitum-or at least
until bankruptcy-remains unimpaired. Those of us who regularly
advocate the rights of victims of dangerously defective products and
human-made environmental catastrophes, but who were not involved
in asbestos litigation in general or the Amchem settlement in particu-
lar, are disentangling the mixed messages of Amchem and teasing out
the threads that must serve as lifelines to the just and timely compen-
sation of those we serve in other cases. We look -for messages of
*Ms. Cabraser is a partner in the San Francisco law firm of Lieff, Cabraser, Hei-
mann & Bernstein, LLP. The firm represents plaintiffs in securities and invest-
ment fraud, employment discrimination, product liability, consumer, antitrust,
and environmental litigation. Ms. Cabraser and her firm have been known to
pursue class actions in the past and are likely to do so again.
1. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), affg Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
2. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joined, concurred in part and
dissented in part. See id. at 2252-58 (Breyer and Stevens, JJ. concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The dissent agreed "with the Court's basic holding that
'settlement is relevant to a class certification,"' but criticized the majority's rejec-
tion of the settlement at issue. Id. at 2252 (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
3. See id. at 2252.
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hope, for evidence of principled pragmatism, and for loyalty to the
historical equitable precepts that were embodied in the first federal
codification of class action procedures, Federal Equity Rule 38, and
remain embedded in its successor, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Aside from the substance of the deal, the settlement procedure
utilized in Amchem was also highly unusual, and at the time perhaps
unique. In most cases involving classes certified for settlement, ac-
tions were originally brought as class actions for litigation and trial.
Class-related discovery has been conducted, and some or all of the
class certification-related briefing has been concluded. Defendants
who would feel compelled to continue opposing class certification for
trial at the district and appellate levels then agree to the certification
of the class for settlement. Ultimately, the case settles after substan-
tial litigation but before the formal class certification decision is
made. Appellate courts have widely used and approved of this pro-
cedure.4
Despite the advance buildup of the Amchem decision, in a very
real sense, and as the decision itself implicitly acknowledges, the de-
cision is limited to the case before it. The settlement featured a
unique and unacceptable combination of future claimants with future
claims,5 potentially inadequate funding,6 insufficient representation of
theoretically divergent interests,7 potential intra-class conflicts,8 and a
class perceived as receiving inferior benefits to those negotiated by
the settling plaintiffs' counsel for their "inventory" of individual cli-
ents.9 Appellate judicial displeasure with these features not only
made disapproval inevitable, but also limited the breadth and appli-
cability of the Amchem decision. The Third Circuit's central and
most far-reaching holding, that a settlement class must equal a trial
class in every respect, was rejected by the Supreme Court. This re-
4. For examples, see cases collected in HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS AcrIONS §§ 11.27-11.28 (3d ed. 1992 & Cum.
Supp. 1997). In Amchem, by contrast, "[t]he class action.., was not intended to
be litigated. Rather, within the space of a single day... the settling parties...
presented to the District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement
agreement, and a joint motion for conditional class certification." Amchem, 117
S. Ct. at 2239.
5. See id. at 2252.
6. See id. at 2251.
7. See id. at 2250-51.
8. See id at 2251.
9. See id. at 2241.
10. See id. at 2248.
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jection, however, resulted not in a reversal, but in an affirmance of
the Third Circuit's decision because the Third Circuit's disdain for
the settlement saved it. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit pre-
cisely because it did view the challenged certification of the class in
the context of the merits of the settlement that gave it birth. The
Court wrote that "the Court of Appeals in fact did not ignore the
settlement; instead, that court homed [sic] in on settlement terms in
explaining why it found the absentees' interests inadequately repre-
sented. The Third Circuit's close inspection of the settlement in that
regard was altogether proper."'"
Justice Breyer criticized the majority's preference for the Third
Circuit's conclusions over the district court's "more than 300 findings
of fact reached after five weeks of comprehensive hearings. 12 Breyer
stated,
I do not believe that we should in effect set aside the find-
ings of the District Court. That court is far more familiar
with the issues and litigants than is a court of appeals or are
we, and therefore has "broad power and discretion... with
respect to matters involving the certification" of class ac-
tions."
This view is a refreshing contrast to recent appellate decisions,
including the Third Circuit's Amchem decision, Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit's Castano v. American Tobacco
Co.," and the Seventh Circuit's In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.6
These decisions appear to reconstruct the record to suit the intended
outcome. Moreover, they disregard the broad discretion afforded
trial courts under Rule 23, as well as the inherently conditional na-
ture of class related rulings. Further, rather than remanding those
matters for corrective procedures or serving as findings, these deci-
sions declare the categorical impossibility of class treatment in those
cases.
Such decisions have had a demonstrable chilling effect on the
willingness of trial courts to exercise the broad discretion that was
formerly-and is still formally-theirs. The decisions have also had a
11. Id. (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 2253 (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
13. Id. (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
14. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
15. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
16. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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deleterious effect on class actions bearing little factual or legal re-
semblance to either Rhone-Poulenc or Castano. The Breyer dissent
should give heart to judges who wonder whether any class is still cer-
tifiable. As this Essay discusses, the Amchem majority opinion has
something for them, too.
In a sense, the Amchem Supreme Court decision was a non-
event. Those who sought to enforce their own nostalgia for the non-
existent halcyon days of "every man has his day in court" were disap-
pointed that Amchem did not smite down either class action settle-
ments or settlement class actions. Indeed, with the finesse of diplo-
macy, the Amchem decision masked with gentle language of
modification what was actually a reversal of the Third Circuit's cen-
tral holding.' It is now established that a class certified for purposes
of settlement must meet the class certification criteria of Rule 23 in
ways different than those of a class certified for trial." The settle-
ment class, as a district mechanism, retains legitimacy in its own right,
with useful guidelines from the Supreme Court for application by
practitioners and courts in future settlements.' Of course, those who
were proponents of the innovative settlement in the Amchem litiga-
tion were also cruelly disappointed by the palpable distaste for the
circumstances of the settlement that is evident in the majority opin-
ion's description of its circumstances.' They were even more cruelly
disappointed by the outcome: the rejection of the Amchem settle-
17. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated the following:
The Third Circuit's opinion stated that each of the requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b)(3) "must be satisfied without taking into account the set-
tlement." lhat statement, petitioners urge, is incorrect.
We agree with petitioners to this limited extent: settlement is rele-
vant to a class certification. The Third Circuit's opinion bears modifica-
tion in that respect.
117 S. Ct. at 2248 (citation omitted).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 2248-52.
20. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated:
Settlement talks... concentrated on devising an administrative scheme
for disposition of asbestos claims not yet in litigation. In these negotia-
tions, counsel for masses of inventory plaintiffs endeavored to represent
the interests of the anticipated future claimants, although those lawyers
then had no attorney-client relationship with such claimants .... After
settling the inventory claims, CCR [consortium of 20 former asbestos
manufacturers-defendants, together with the plaintiffs' lawyers CCR
had approached, launche this case, exclusively involving persons out-
side the MDL Panel's province-plaintiffs without already pending law-
suits.
Id. at 2239.
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ment and its sister settlement, Aheam,2' which was vacated and re-
manded for further consideration in light of Amchem.2
So while those involved on both sides of the debate in the Am-
chem settlement may view it as through a dark glass, and while those
least familiar with the Amchem decision itself, or the events and de-
cisions that preceded it, may don rose-colored glasses to proclaim
that all class action settlements must die, the true import of Amchem
is at once less obvious, more diffuse, and more hopeful. It is best
perceived, to the extent that true perception is possible at this early
date, through Lucy's kaleidoscope eyes.n The meaning of Amchem is
elusive. Each must seek and find it on her own. Perhaps through ex-
ercise of willful optimism, but with an undeniable basis in the lan-
guage of the opinion itself, I find that Amchem not only permits class
actions to live but is fundamentally life-affirming.24 There is not only
life, but newly invigorated life, for class actions after Amchem.
Admittedly, Amchem's immediate effects have been largely
negative from the perspective of plaintiffs' advocates. Without
meaning to do so, the opinion seems to have stymied, at least tempo-
rarily, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee's efforts to codify
separate criteria for settlement-purposes classes in a new Rule
23(b)(4).' While Amchem, by its very terms, advocates the contin-
ued-and perhaps expanded-use of class actions in securities, anti-
trust, and consumer class actions, some courts have seized upon the
Amchem decision, or more accurately, the media coverage and legal
commentary that depicted the decision as a blow to class actions, as
an added excuse, or even a mandate, to deny class certification.
26
21. See Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (mem.), vacating and re-
manding In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 101 F.3d 368
(5th Cir. 1996).
22. See Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. at 2503.
23. The author is not advocating drug use as an aid to interpretation of Su-
preme Court decisions. She and her many contemporaries at the bar and on the
bench are entitled to the metaphors of their youth. In deference to those older-
and wiser-who recall the late 1960s with a residual sense of disapprobation, I
offer a more venerable colloquialism as an alternative title for this essay:
"Amchem: 23 Skidoo?"
24. I use this term, advisedly, to curry favor with the readership in the state of
Southern California. The term is not in common usage in the North-with
Marin County constituting a notable exception.
25. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2247.
26. See, e.g., Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., No. 96-2913, 1997 WL 559888
(La. Sept. 9, 1997) (reversing lower court's class certification of plaintiffs who
suffered property damage and personal injury as a result of noxious emissions
from defendant's petrochemical plants, citing Amchem as the main reason for
January 1998]
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Hopefully, this effect will be short-lived. We should expect that the
long-term impact of Amchem will be essentially favorable to those
class actions that pit individuals of average means against modern
corporations in cases involving claims too small to litigate feasibly on
a case-by-case basis. This description not only covers most securities
fraud, consumer fraud, and antitrust class actions, as Amchem itself
acknowledged,2 but it also describes most mass torts-even those for
personal injury or wrongful death. Equity, the foundation of the
American class action, does not permit any litigant to be priced out
of access to civil justice.
Thus, Amchem has lasting significance, I believe, in three re-
spects, which are the focus of the remainder of this Essay. First, Am-
chem reinvokes the equitable principles inherent in each class action,
as these have evolved in American law. Second, Amchem insists
upon due process for class members and judicial assurance of their
rights to adequate representation, and implicitly condemns those who
exploit the class action procedure, not as a pragmatic means to a just
end, but as the instant gratification of self-interest. Finally, in con-
junction with Supreme Court action in other recent contexts,2 Am-
chem has not only granted explicit approval but also implicit en-
dorsement to the migration of state law-based class actions from the
federal to the state courts for certification, trial, and settlement.
This migration has in large part been one of necessity, as federal
courts have denied certification or decertified classes that in earlier
practice would have gone forward in the federal system. Under our
federalism, there is no litigation vacuum; these cases have moved to
state court. To condemn either this move or the state courts that will
certify classes is often an exercise in mere chauvinism. On the basis of
my experience in the federal and state systems, I believe that the
reversal).
27. "Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or
securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws." Amchem 117 S. Ct. at 2250.
28. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996)
(affirming the jurisdiction of state courts to resolve nationwide class claims, in-
cluding federal securities fraud claims that could have been litigated only in the
federal courts). In a surprising sequel, the Ninth Circuit, on remand, has held
that the Supreme Court did not dispositively establish the full faith and credit
due the state court judgment. The majority held that the order approving the
settlement was subject to collateral attack for failure of the state court to make
findings of adequacy or representation. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29678 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1997); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (upholding the propriety of nationwide class certifi-
cation by state courts in the Rule 23(b)(3) context if due process-notice, oppor-
tunity to be heard, and the right to opt out-was preserved).
THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES
state courts are often the equal of federal courts in their ability to
fairly and efficiently manage, try, and resolve complex class action
litigation.
II. THE PRIMACY OF EQUITY
As Amchem reminds us, modem Rule 23-operative throughout
the federal court system, and adopted by most states-has its deepest
roots in English equity practice.29 Equity as implemented under the
class action rules, however, has evolved to embody three distinct, and
distinctly American principles: (1) efficiency and economy in judicial
administration; (2) universal access to civil justice; and (3) empow-
erment of small claimants to achieve equality between humans and
corporate entities.30 The Court invokes and affirms each of these
principles in the Amchem decision as the class action's continuing
mandate. As Amchem reminds us:
[T]he Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindi-
cation of "the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents
into court at all."
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not pro-
vide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential re-
coveries to something worth someone's (usually an attor-
29. See, e.g., How v. Tenants of Broomsgrove, I Vern. 22, 23 Eng. Rep. 277
(1681); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION:
THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY
DEVICES 125-26 (hereinafter 'INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE"); Stephen C. Yeazell, From
Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27
UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1980).
30. As Judge Weinstein summarizes the evolution of equity principles in mass
tort jurisprudence,
[c]ourts of equity traditionally have taken into account the equities-the
concrete issues of fact and fairness of the particular situation-in fash-
ioning remedies. In the mass tort context, these include (1) fairly and
expeditiously compensating numerous victims and (2) deterring wrong-
ful conduct where possible while (3) preventing overdeterrence in mass
torts from shutting down industry or removing needed products from
the market, (4) keeping the courts from becoming paralyzed by tens or
even hundreds of thousands of repetitive personal injury cases, and (5)
reducing transactional costs of compensation.
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, at 125.
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ney's) labor.3
Courts tempted to invoke Amchem to justify the denial of certi-
fication or the decertification of nationwide classes would be well
advised to heed the passages quoted above. They call for the contin-
ued use of the class action mechanism to fulfill its core purposes. It is
self-evident that claimants in such cases cannot, will not, and should
not be expected to initiate or pursue individual litigation as a pre-
requisite to relief. The existence of the class action rule and its
grounding in equity means they need not do so. They are entitled to
the representative prosecution of their claims and the courts' protec-
tion of their interests.
But after these principled declarations, the Amchem decision
seems to go awry in analyzing the prospective personal in-
jury/wrongful death claims whose class-wide compromise was before
it, as if the claimants themselves could, and thus should, assert their
claims individually. For many years, courts and commentators have
been stating the obvious: In a mass tort context, individuals have, as
a matter of economic and institutional reality, little control over their
individual destinies. This is not the fault of class actions but is a
product of limited individual and institutional resonances and is ex-
acerbated when class actions are not employed.3 2
31. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109
F.3d 338,344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
32. See, e.g., Hon. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983). Judge Williams, whose comprehensive, sua sponte
class certification decision in the Dalkon Shield IUD litigation was reversed by
the Ninth Circuit in In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), was ultimately vindicated, thir-
teen years later, by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996), which held "that the law of this circuit, and
more specifically our leading decision in Dalkon Shield, does not create any ab-
solute bar to the certification of a multi-state plaintiff class action in the medical
products liability context." Id. at 1230. The Ninth Circuit focused on the suffi-
ciency of the trial court's formal findings on certification criteria:
We decline to hold, at least at this early stage of the litigation, that there
can never be a plaintiff class certification in this particular case. We do
hold, however, on the basis of the record before us, that we must vacate
this class certification order, because there has been no demonstration
of how this class satisfies important Rule 23 requirements, including the
predominance of common issues over individual issues and the superior-
ity of class adjudication over other litigation alternatives.
Id. So, too, did the Amchem decision acknowledge that "the text of [Rule 23]
does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification," and rec-
ognized that "[e]ven mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster
may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement."
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250. Thus, while predominance and superiority in the
THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES
The right to an individual jury trial on each personal injury or
wrongful death claim is a noble idea and against those who would
deny any individual access to the courts, it must be defended at all
costs. But most individuals do not, and cannot, seek such access to
the courts, regardless of the merits or the economic value of their
claims. The inexorable law of relativity is at work. In a tort claim
arising from a one-on-one incident such as an auto accident or a slip-
and-fall, the monetary value of a personal injury or wrongful death
claim may make the expense of hiring experts, conducting an investi-
gation, and outlasting an insurance-funded defense attractive to an
experienced plaintiffs' lawyer. Nonetheless, there are not hundreds,
thousands, or even millions of identical claims threatening to inun-
date the local court system. The system has developed ways to man-
age, try, and resolve the routine accident and other tort claims that
are filed in a typical year. Notwithstanding the circumstances that
make the jury trial of each such claim possible, most of these claims
settle. While most such cases are brought and settled as individual
suits, few tort litigants demand or achieve their individual days in
court.
The individual trial of every tort claim in the mass tort context is
not only statistically unlikely but also logistically impossible. Cer-
tainly, some victims of mass torts will be lucky and will proceed to
judgment or settlement in advance of their less fortunate peers, for
reasons having little or nothing to do with the relative merits of their
claims. Yet how can a supposedly absolute right to an individual jury
trial be granted to the few and denied to the many, without placing
the entire civil justice system in disrepute? Despite our noble senti-
ments, this right is best expressed in Clint Eastwood's ominous ques-
tion, "Do you feel lucky?" For instance, in the asbestos litigation, the
decades-long prelude to Amchem and Ahearn, the ability to reach
trial or settlement before manufacturers plunged into bankruptcy or
the court system grounded to a complete halt depended upon the
random variable of luck. That is, the system deteriorated into a lot-
tery,33 and most litigants-plaintiffs and defendants alike-were in-
deed unlucky. Such a disaster was precisely what the class action was
mass tort/product liability context must be irrefutably shown and scrupulously
found, class treatment of multi-state and nationwide tort claims remains both
possible and proper.
33. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(commenting on the "lottery effects" often seen in asbestos litigation, in which a
seriously ill claimant may recover little, while a far less seriously ill claimant hits
the jackpot).
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designed to avoid.
If individuals cannot enjoy their full measure of rights in an ab-
solute, timely, and cost-effective fashion without impairing the simi-
lar rights and interests of others, equity must intercede to fairly ap-
portion the opportunity for adjudication and the assets available for
compensation. This may require "mandatory" class certification un-
der the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).' Class treat-
ment may compromise, in the absolutist sense, the rights of class
members to control their own destinies. As is all too frequently the
case, however, the destiny of a lawsuit is placed beyond the individu-
als' control by the sheer number of claims arising from the sale of a
mass-produced product and the overwhelming magnitude of the ag-
gregate monetary value of such claims in relationship to the assets
and insurance available to satisfy them, particularly if the defendants
desire to stay in business.
Whether all mass tort litigation shciuld be allowed-or even en-
couraged-to exhaust the litigants and the system until the endgame
is reached, could be debated endlessly. Often, upon conclusion of a
case, claimants have foregone any reasonable chance of compensa-
tion while defendants are punished with corporate extinction or in-
solvency. It is the duty of equity to prevent such outcomes. This
duty was recognized in Coburn v. 4-R Corporation,35 where the court
stated that "[i]n no event ... should ... litigation become an un-
seemly race to the courtroom door with monetary prizes for a few
winners and worthless judgments for the rest." 6
And thus we come to the central paradox of Amchem. While
noting that the "opt-out" Rule 23(b)(3) procedure used in the settle-
ment before it was a modem departure from the equitable proce-
34. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2245. The Ninth Circuit summarized this con-
cept:
It is conceivable of course, that the claims of named plaintiffs would be
so large that if the action were to proceed as an individual action the
decision "would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially im-
pair or impede their ability to protect their interests." This would be the
case where the claims of all plaintiffs exceeded the assets of the defen-
dant and hence to allow any group of individuals to be fully compensated
would impair the rights of those not in court.
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976)
(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(B)) (emphasis added). Portions of the Dalkon
Shield IUD Litigation were resolved in precisely this way. See In re A.H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d 709, 741 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
35. 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
36. Id. at 45.
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dures available under the earlier incarnations of the Rule, the Am-
chem Court also knew and articulated the practical differences be-
tween a trial class and a settlement class: while manageability for
trial was not relevant, the requirement of adequate representation
demanded stricter scrutiny in the settlement context.' Adequacy of
representation is the touchstone of due process in equity's direct de-
scendants-the "mandatory" classes certified in cases seeking pri-
marily injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief, and in cases
like Coburn, those involving "a limited fund."
Despite the presence of the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out right as a
safety valve for those dissatisfied with their representation by the
plaintiffs and attorneys who were the settlement's proponents and
the ability of dissatisfied class members to pursue their own destinies,
adequacy became the stumbling block of the Amchem settlement.
Had the Court approved that settlement, no opt-out right would ex-
ist, and arguably, no right to notice at all. Also, the Supreme Court's
Amchem decision acknowledges that there would not be any pre-
dominance or superiority requirements to meet. There are hints in
both the Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions that an analo-
gous decision brought under the "mandatory" provision of the Rule
might survive.38 However, it is unlikely that the settlement's resort to
the "pure equity" provisions of Rule 23(b)(1) would have saved it,
although the procedural legitimacy of the settlement would have
been questioned less. Whether it was stillborn or simply nagged to
death, the Amchem settlement was doomed because the appellate
courts disdained the ethically controversial context in which the deal
was made. Indeed, as noted above, the Third Circuit's rejection of
the particulars of the settlement saved that court from outright rever-
sal, despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the Third Circuit's cen-
tral holding that a class proposed for settlement purposes must meet
Rule 23 criteria as if it were intended to proceed to trial.
The majority's dissatisfaction with the settlement is palpable
throughout the opinion; the Third Circuit was equally merciless on
the merits. Both decisions attempt to focus their discussions on the
settlement's purported straying beyond the boundaries of Rule 23.
37. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
38. Amchem's sister settlement, the Ahearn settlement, was indeed such a
mandatory settlement. Whether this procedural distinction will save it, however,
remains to be seen, as the action is again before the Fifth Circuit. See Flanagan
v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 101 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1996), va-
cated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
January 1998]
384 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:373
The Amchem settlement was criticized incessantly by academics and
lawyers from the date of its preliminary approval through the date of
its ultimate demise. While unquestionably unique, the settlement be-
came the centerpiece of discussion in a hundred seminars on mass
tort class actions. It was the high-profile exception that would test-
and in the hopes of some, revoke-the Rule.
With the possible exception of Amchem's sister, Ahearn, no
other deal has been negotiated or approved under the same circum-
stances. Because the Amchem settlement was a bold departure from
conventional settlement practice, the appellate decisions disapprov-
ing it should pose no threat to mass tort class action jurisprudence.
Indeed, despite the pall which some perceived the Supreme Court's
Amchem decision has cast upon the role of the class action in organiz-
ing, managing, structuring for trial, and resolving nationwide claims
arising from defective products and consumer frauds, the language of
Amchem itself reasserts the vital role of class actions in our modern
consumer society.
While stopping short of embroidering "a mass tort is a class tort"
on my underwear, I believe that more often than not, class member-
ship offers better prospects for fair treatment and reasonable com-
pensation than "traditional" aggregation regardless of the severity of
the injury or the magnitude of the claim. As the Amchem decision's
discussion of the asbestos litigation demonstrates, the alternatives for
most mass tort claimants are not class membership or individual rep-
resentation. The choice, if any, is between being part of a lawyer's
"inventory" or part of a class. All things considered, I would rather
be in a class. Attorneys' fees are lower and are directly regulated by
the court. On this point alone, class membership can mean the dif-
ference between a forty percent contingent fee and a fifteen to
twenty percent court-awarded fee.
In class actions, courts enforce the economies of scale: transac-
tion costs are lower and more of every dollar paid by defendants
translates directly into plaintiffs' recovery. In the main, entrepre-
neurial attorneys who gather large inventories of plaintiffs do not
pass the savings to their clients. If clients do not receive truly indi-
vidualized treatment by their attorney, they should not be required to
pay for it. In class actions, courts not only regulate costs and attor-
neys' fees, but also regulate the conduct of attorneys and, again as
demonstrated by Amchem, scrupulously guard the interests of class
members. Sometimes, as Justice Breyer pointed out, this philosophy
taken to the extreme defeats its practical purpose, and the best tri-
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umphs over the good. Nonetheless, in most instances, a mass tort
victim will be better served by the combination of economy, effi-
ciency, court scrutiny, and enforced standards that class actions alone
possess.
Ironically, class membership may afford more individual treat-
ment than does individual representation. Class members receive
notice of reports concerning important events in the litigation. Class
members have representative plaintiffs who are like themselves and
who act as watchdogs of their interests. Class members' claims can-
not be settled, released, or dismissed without court review and ap-
proval. Class members' lawyers cannot be paid more than a reason-
able fee under all the circumstances. Class members can come to
court without counsel to comment and object. "Individually repre-
sented" inventory plaintiffs should be so lucky.
There is something inherently appealing in the traditional model
of an individual client whose unique interests are zealously protected
by a dedicated advocate. But much to the favor of defendants, this
tradition does little to empower plaintiffs in a mass tort setting.
Moreover, in the typical "opt-out" class action, those who wish to
have such representation have a right to it. In fact, they may choose
among: (1) class memberships with representation by class counsel,
(2) class membership with representation by counsel of their own
choosing, or (3) exclusion from the class for pursuit of their individ-
ual claims.39 If the courts view Amchem as a license to deny class
treatment, mass tort victims will be deprived of this choice, and we
might as well declare defendants the winners at the outset of each
litigation, regardless of the merits.
Ultimately, the Amchem settlement failed because of judicial
concern for the interests of the class members, perception of intra-
class conflict, and inadequate representation.40 But who checks for
adequacy of representation or conflict among the units in a plaintiff
lawyers' inventory? Traditional aggregation disenfranchises claim-
ants who have no direct recourse to the court and whose representa-
tion occurs largely beyond judicial control. The subtext of Amchem
is that the settlement was dissapproved not because it was packaged
as a class action, but because, in the view of the courts, the class
members' rights were traded away for the inventory plaintiffs' bene-
fit. It would be a shame if Amchem, decided upon the best principles
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2).
40. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
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of class representation, were applied to deprive mass tort victims of
the opportunity for class membership.
III. STATE COURTS: THE HEIRS OF EQUITY
Unfortunately for those in the federal judiciary and those who
practice in the federal courts, state courts will increasingly take the
leading role in fulfilling Amchem's equitable precepts. Perhaps Am-
chem itself, properly understood and applied, will reverse this trend
and restore to the federal courts the confidence and courage needed
to exercise their inherent equitable jurisdiction to bring judicial ac-
cess and fair compensation to those unselfconscious and amorphous
legions whom the hyper-technical, rule-bound, and inequitable inter-
pretation of the class action rule has consigned to litigation by lottery.
It is no secret that class actions-formerly the province of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction-are being brought increasingly in the state
courts. Class actions, including those nationwide in scope, are in-
creasingly being tried and settled in these courts. Many academic
commentators have lamented this trend, and some federal courts
have disregarded or disparaged the certification decisions of their
state court brethren.
There has, however, been an abdication by some federal courts
of their rightful leadership in the struggle toward the full realization
of the goals of civil justice.41  The judicial escapism exhibited by
courts that avoid the management challenges of nationwide class
certification by invoking purported predominant variations in state
law while ignoring or misstating the substance of state law, 42 or who
41. The federal courts do continue to have their judicial champions. As
Judge Weinstein declared,
I do not believe that the federal and other courts... should retreat from
their post-World War II role of protecting the injured individual and of-
fering a forum to vindicate economic, political, social, and medical
rights. More justice for more people should be our goal-not less jus-
tice for ever fewer people. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with those who
would have the courts attempt to treat mass tort cases on a one-by-one
basis, as though they were two-car accidents.
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 127.
42. For example, recent federal decisions recited the purported need for
proof of reliance to justify the non-certification of fraud claims, despite the long-
established case law that "reliance"-or, more correctly, the causation element of
fraud-may be proved by circumstantial evidence and does not require individ-
ual testimony as a matter of law. See, e.g., Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176
(1925). Hunter and many other state cases have long since resolved the issues of
privity and reliance that are the resort of judges desiring a principled basis upon
which to justify denial of class treatment. These cases did so in a manner fully
consistent with class treatment and classwide proof. On privity, the Hunter court
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consign persons of small means to a deadly war of attrition and deny
them class treatment so that the "traditional" methods of thousands
of individual trials might somehow yield a definitive outcome,43 drives
many litigants to state courts for relief. Additionally, there is an en-
tirely justified preference for state courts as class certification courts
of first resort since these are courts of general, not limited, jurisdic-
tion and must address the issues.
Most states have incorporated Rule 23, often verbatim, into their
codes or rules of civil procedure. Moreover, many states predated
the federal system in their invocation of equity jurisprudence to cer-
tify class actions. State court experience with class actions can be
traced, as in the federal courts, to the development of American eq-
uity doctrines in the nineteenth century, and state courts are often at
the forefront of adapting these principles to modem needs. Indeed, it
could be fairly said that the state courts have remembered, with
greater fidelity, the equitable precepts of efficiency, access, empow-
erment, and economy recently invoked by Amchem, which some fed-
eral courts have readily forgotten.
The codification of the equity class action occurred in many
states before Federal Rule 23, or its precursor, Equity Rule 38, was in
existence. These equity statutes typically borrowed from equity ju-
risprudence and codified the fundamental principles to apply the
stated the following:
While some connection, of course, direct or indirect, between the party
charged with making the false representations and the party relying
thereon must be shown, it is not essential, however, in support of a
cause of action for damages resulting from false representations that the
false representations be shown to have been made directly to the party
claiming to have relied upon them.
Id. at 185 (citation omitted). On reliance, the court wrote that:
[1]t was not essential to a [misrepresentation] cause of action.., to pro-
duce direct evidence that [plaintiff] relied upon such false representa-
tions. The fact of reliance upon alleged false representations may be in-
ferred from the circumstances attending the transaction which
oftentimes afford much stronger and more satisfactory evidence of the
inducement... than ... direct testimony to the same effect. We are
satisfied that it may be fairly inferred from the evidence concerning the
nature of the transaction... the relation of the parties, and the circum-
stances surrounding the entire transaction ....
Id. at 185-86 (citations omitted).
43. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir.
1996). The Fifth Circuit decertified the nationwide tobacco addiction class, stat-
ing that "'[T]raditional ways of proceeding reflect far more than habit. They re-
flect the very culture of the jury trial .... ' The collective wisdom of individual
juries is necessary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry or, in-
deed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury." Id. at 752 (quoting In re Fi-
breboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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class action to suits in both law and equity.44 The state courts were
again in the forefront in matters of consumer justice. The rights of
consumers to compensation for unfair business practices, false ad-
vertising, and dangerous, misrepresented, or overpriced products was
accompanied by the recognition of products liability law45 and by a
growing judicial recognition that such rights were meaningless if eco-
nomic barriers prevented litigants from pursuing their claims. The
class action mechanism was invoked to prevent mass producers and
mass advertisers from cheating the many, a little at a time. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court landmark decision in Vasquez v. Superior
Court46 is illustrative of this movement.
Protection of unwary consumers from being duped by un-
scrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in
contemporary society .... The alternatives of multiple liti-
44. In England, the class action doctrine, a seventeenth century invention,
was restated and shaped in a series of equity decisions, notably those of Lord El-
don in the early nineteenth century. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litiga-
ton to Class Action, Part 1: The Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA
L. REV. 514, 548-52 (1980); see also INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 548.
In the United States, Justice Story formulated the American equitable doctrine
of the representative suit based upon the English case law. See Scott D. Miller,
Note, Certifichtion of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1371, 1381 (1984). The class suit was adopted by many of the states in their
Field Codes and related codification movements of the late nineteenth century.
These state code provisions simply restated the formulations of English case law
to provide that "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973). Federal Equity Rule 38 later used vir-
tually identical language: "[W]hen the question is one of common or general in-
terest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracti-
cable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole."
45. "[T]he classic [state] cases of products liability law that propelled the law
toward tort and away from contract... were grounded, in part, on the courts'
keen awareness of advertising's growing power over consumer decisionmaking."
Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Products Liability Theory,
107 HARV. L. REv. 895, 895 (1994). These cases, including Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), and Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), observed that consumers of
mass-produced and mass-marketed goods and services must rely on the represen-
tations made and impressions created by modem advertising. Consumers have
been "lulled" by manufacturer-provided advertising and marketing devices and
"[u]nder modem conditions the ordinary layman, on responding to the importun-
ing of colorful advertising, has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect
or to determine the fitness of [a product] for use." Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 83.
46. 4 Cal. 3d 800,484 P.2d 964,94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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gation (joinder, intervention, consolidation, the test case) do
not sufficiently protect the consumer's rights because these
devices "presuppose 'a group of economically powerful
parties who are obviously able and willing to take care of
their own interests individually through individual suits or
individual decisions about joinder or intervention.'"
Frequently numerous consumers are exposed to the same
dubious practice by the same seller so that proof of the
prevalence of the practice as to one consumer would pro-
vide proof for all. Individual actions by each of the de-
frauded consumers is often impracticable because the
amount of individual recovery would be insufficient to jus-
tify bringing a separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller
retains the benefit of its wrongful conduct. A class action by
consumers produces several salutary byproducts, including a
therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudu-
lent practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises by cur-
tailing illegitimate competition, and avoidance to the judi-
cial process of the burden of multiple litigation involving
identical claims. The benefit to the parties and the courts
would, in many circumstances, be substantial.47
By contrast, lamented Vasquez,
[i]f each is left to assert his rights alone if and when he can,
there will at best be a random and fragmentary enforce-
ment, if there is any at all. This result is not only unfortu-
nate in the particular case, but it will operate seriously to
impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie
much contemporary law.4
Vasquez was followed by a series of California decisions that certified
or mandated the certification of statewide and nationwide classes in
cases of consumer fraud, unfair business practices, and product liabil-
ity.
49
47. Id at 808, 484 P.2d at 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 807, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
49. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (1980) (establishing doctrine of market share liability in
DES tort claimants' class action); Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal.
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California was not alone. Other states demonstrated a sophisti-
cated understanding of the historical underpinnings, equitable prin-
ciples, and modem application of the class action mechanism. For
example, in Wood River Area Development Corporation v. Germania
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc'n,' the Illinois Court of Appeals
drew direct parallels between the original groups whose rights were
adjudicated in English equity practice, "rural tenants and landlords,
and parishioners and parsons," and the masses of average Americans
who depend on them today: "No matter how refined, how revised, or
how evolved this flashy import becomes, the goal of the class action
remains the same-justice for the lowly, the tenants, the parishioners,
the multitudes."'"
Most recently, Judge Ramos of the New York State Supreme
Court invoked these principles in the certification of five classes of
New York smokers against the major tobacco companies on con-
sumer fraud claims. In so doing, he reminded us that
[t]he purpose of the class action is to provide "a means of
inducing socially and ethically responsible behavior on the
part of large and wealthy institutions. Without the benefit
of the class action, these institutions could act with impunity
... since, realistically speaking, our legal system inhibits the
bringing of suits based upon small claims."5 2
Thus, state courts recognized early-and have steadfastly re-
membered-what the federal courts appear frequently to forget: that
modem society increasingly pits mortal humans of limited means
against large corporations of multi-national influence and perpetual
existence. Unassisted by procedures that allow individuals to effec-
tively aggregate their claims and try to resolve common issues in a
unitary fashion, the battle remains fatally unequal. Justice cannot re-
sult from unequal access to the mechanisms of justice. Justice cannot
result from procedures that are priced beyond the reach of individu-
als. Justice-including the right to an individual jury trial-is a cruel
App. 3d 605, 609-10, 236 Cal. Rptr. 605, 606 (1987) (seeking damages and injunc-
tive relief for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair business practices in
long distance telephone overcharges); Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal.
App. 3d 699, 702, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254, 255-56 (1973) (seeking injunctive relief for
truck wheel product liability).
50. 555 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. App. 1990).
51. Id. at 1152.
52. Memorandum Disposing of Pending Class Certification Motions at 15,
Zito v. The American Tobacco Co. (N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997) (Index No. 110949/96)
(quoting Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr. Properties Inc., 574 N.Y.S. 672 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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joke to those who will be worn down and worn out, in pocketbook
and in spirit, by the endless pitched battles of a war of attrition
funded by corporate defendants who can afford to spend millions for
a defense and not a penny for compensation.53
Why am I talking about consumer law in a mass tort symposium?
Because we are all consumers. The products that injure us, as well as
the products whose virtues are misrepresented, or for which we are
overcharged, are predominantly mass-produced, mass-marketed, and
fungible. This is true in the area of pharmaceutical and medical de-
vices, the two main arenas in which the controversies of mass tort
litigation-with the notable exception of the asbestos disaster-have
been waged. We no longer take a prescription devised by our family
doctor to the local druggist who concocts and dispenses it. The medi-
cal devices with which we are implanted are no longer the custom-
designed, handcrafted prostheses of the polio era. Drugs are mass-
marketed not just to doctors, but directly to the public in full-page
advertisements that run in People, Time, and other general interest
magazines. Direct advertising of mass-produced pharmaceuticals
may soon make the "learned intermediary" doctrine obsolete.' Over
18 million prescriptions for the popular "Fen-Phen" diet drug combi-
nation were written in 1996.5' Between one and two million Ameri-
can women have been implanted with mass-produced breast im-
plants. 6 When one size is touted as fitting all, and all are urged to
become one size, it is little wonder that the first juncture at which
53. Of course, the federal courts were far from silent on this topic. Over 55
years ago, the Seventh Circuit held that
[t]o permit the defendants to contest liability with each claimant in a
single, separate suit, would, in many cases give defendants an advantage
which would be almost equivalent to closing the door of justice to all
small claimants. This is what we think the class suit practice was to pre-
vent.
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
54. The "learned intermediary" doctrine provides that a drug manufacturer is
relieved of tort liability if adequate warning of the potential hazards of the prod-
uct is given to the physician. See Jeffrey E. Grell, Restatement (Third) of Torts,
Section 8(D): Back to the Future of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19
HAMLINE L. REV. 349 (1996).
55. See Jane E. Brody, Obesity Drugs: Weighing the Risks to Health Against
the Small Victories, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1997, at Cl; Fen-Phen Study Sparks
Concern: Experts Address Some of the More Common Questions, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., July 16, 1997, at El.
56. See John Schwartz, Breast Implants Require Later Surgery, Study Finds;
Follow-up Procedures Reported for Limited Problems, WASH. PosT, Mar. 6,
1996, at A3. No one is sure of the precise number because none of the manufac-
turers kept track of who-or how many-received these devices.
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manufacturer defendants recall the individuality of their customers is
when they invoke it to oppose class certification.
Perhaps it is most fitting that plaintiffs increasingly resort to
state courts as their battlegrounds of choice for their claims against
corporate defendants. Although the law recognizes corporations as
persons and makes no distinction between the human and the corpo-
rate, and although corporations enjoy perpetual existence and an ac-
cumulation of capital unmatched by mere humans, it was not always
so. Modem limited-liability corporations are creations of the mid-to-
late nineteenth centuryY They are creatures of state charter-not
federal law-and exist at the state's sufferance. As a principle of law,
courts must make no distinction between humans and corporations as
equal persons before the law: every jury receives this instruction in
every trial involving a corporate defendant.'
However, how this equality is implemented to achieve justice be-
tween these two very different categories of persons is in the ambit of
the equity jurisdiction employed by every court. That corporations
dread the states who gave them life, and that corporations have fu-
eled a massive outcry against the notion of nationwide classes in state
courts, is the ultimate irony. State-chartered corporations act na-
tionally and internationally. State courts to whom they owe their ex-
istence should be free to certify nationwide classes of individuals with
claims against them. Only then will the equitable precepts of econ-
omy, efficiency, equal access, and empowerment be fulfilled.
It was a California court, one hundred years ago, which noted
the equitable heritage of California's class action statute and em-
ployed it to resolve a most difficult problem, exclaiming: "Indeed,
equity fears no difficulty."59 Likewise, equity should not allow, in this
57. See, STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.02 (rev.
ed. 1997); Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIsT. 1, 3 (1945).
58. See, e.g., H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, 18 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCrIONS § 2.01 (1994).
You must deliberate on this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice,
or passion for or against any party to the suit. This means that the case
should be considered and decided as an action between persons of equal
standing in the community. A corporation or an insurance company is
entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as a private individual. All
persons stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in
a court of justice.
Id.
59. Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Church, 119 Cal. 477, 484, 51 P. 841, 844
(1897) (imposing equitable resolution of dispute among warring seceding factions
of Presbyterian church); see also Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302
THE CLASS STRUGGLE CONTINUES
presumably more advanced age, the theoretical existence of
"nuances" of multiple states' laws to preclude the unitary adjudica-
tion of common issues of fact, when in fact a review of those states'
laws, as implemented by those states' courts, reveals virtually identi-
cal jury instructions.' ° Equity simply requires courage.
This courage exists today in the federal as well as in the state
courts. Amchem, properly interpreted, should empower more federal
judges to act on the courage that should accompany life tenure. That
courage is fully supported by the equitable heritage of the class ac-
tion and the judges' power to invoke it. This courage must be em-
ployed in the personal injury arena, as well as in cases of financial or
non-injury consumer fraud and product defect. The need is just as
strong, the inequality between the individual plaintiffs and the corpo-
rate defendant is just as daunting, and the potential for injustice is
even more pronounced. Everycourt should be free to be persuaded,
as was Judge Brimmer in In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., to ref-
use to decertify a nationwide tort claimant class despite an appellate
ruling in Rhone-Poulenc.62 Judge Brimmer, consciously or not, ech-
oed the words of the California Supreme Court in Vasquez,3 and of
(1853) ("The rule is well established, that where the parties interested are nu-
merous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of the body may
maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others....").
60. The "nuance," a fundamental particle of academic legal writing even
smaller and more elusive than its physics counterpart, the neutrino, is not detect-
able at the jury instruction level, at which the law is applied by finders of fact to
reach a just result. Product liability jury instructions fully compatible with the
laws of all states fill a single slim volume. See RONALD W. EADES, JURY
INSTRUCrIONS ON PRODuCrs LIABILITY (2d ed. 1993). Courts, like the Alabama
state court in Ex parte Masonite Corp., 681 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. 1996), that have ac-
tually reviewed nationwide surveys of pattern jury instructions and directed the
litigants to provide specific instructions for use in the liability and damages
phases of multistage class actions, have sustained the class status of such cases,
concluding that juries may be properly and thoroughly instructed on the opera-
tive law of all states.
Fortunately, there is appellate as well as trial-level case law that affirms
the feasibility of such classwide trials. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig.,
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). Most recently, Judge
Spiegel of the Southern District of Ohio recertified a nationwide product liabil-
ity/personal injury class, through the utilization of subclasses based upon a struc-
tural analysis of the commonalities and distinctions among the laws of the states
on strict product liability and negligence. The case is set for classwide trial on
common issues in late 1997. See In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D.
271 (S.D. Ohio 1997), appeal dismissed sua sponte and mandamus denied (6th
Cir., June 11, 1997).
61. 161 F.R.D. 446 (D. Wyo. 1995).
62. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
63. 4 Cal. 3d 800,484 P.2d 964,94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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Supreme Court Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall in Eisen,"
and presaged the language of Amchem by stating:
After hearing hours of debate from those opposing and fa-
voring class certification, one attorney from behind the bar
offered the most persuasive argument for the superiority of
class certification. He simply stated that he represented
only six plaintiffs and that none of them had very large
claims. This counsel then argued that without class certifi-
cation neither he nor his clients had the resources to have
their day in court against a large defendant like Copley.
The Court, too, believes that no plaintiff with a legitimate
claim for a jurisdictional amount should be elirninated from
federal court because he does not have the resources to liti-
gate, and concludes that class certification is a superior
method of adjudication.65
May it be ever so.
64. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In a partially dissent-
ing opinion issued the same year as Vasquez, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall stated:
I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be
innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who
would go begging for justice without the class action but who could with
all regard to due process be protected by it .... The class action is one
of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who
command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with a view of
creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to
those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Id. at 185-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
65. In re Copley Pharm., 158 F.R.D. at 492.
